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ABSTRACT
It has been demonstrated that adversarial graphs, i.e., graphs with
imperceptible perturbations added, can cause deep graph models
to fail on node/graph classification tasks. In this paper, we extend
adversarial graphs to the problem of community detection which is
much more difficult. We focus on black-box attack and aim to hide
targeted individuals from the detection of deep graph community
detection models, which has many applications in real-world sce-
narios, for example, protecting personal privacy in social networks
and understanding camouflage patterns in transaction networks.
We propose an iterative learning framework that takes turns to up-
date two modules: one working as the constrained graph generator
and the other as the surrogate community detection model. We also
find that the adversarial graphs generated by our method can be
transferred to other learning based community detection models.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Mathematics of computing → Graph algorithms; • Com-
puting methodologies→ Unsupervised learning;
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1 INTRODUCTION
Community detection is one of the most widely studied topics in
the graph domain, which aims to discover groups of nodes in a
graph, such that the intra-group connections are denser than the
inter-group ones [33]. It has been widely applied to many real-
world applications ranging from functional module identifications
in a protein-protein interaction network [1], scientific discipline
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discoveries in a coauthor network [36], to fraud organization de-
tections in a user-user transaction network [2]. However, with the
rapid development of the community detection algorithms, people
realize that their privacy is over-mined [6]. In this context, some
work begins to investigate the techniques that allow to hide indi-
viduals, communities [9, 34] or degrade the overall performance of
community detection algorithms [6], mostly based on heuristics or
genetic algorithms.
Recently deep graph learning models [15, 26] have achieved re-
markable performance in many graph learning tasks. Meanwhile,
some studies [8, 37] notice that deep graph models can be easily
attacked on tasks such as node/graph classification. Motivated by
these findings, in this work, we aim to address the following ques-
tion: how vulnerable are graph learning based community detection
methods? Can we hide individuals by imperceptible graph perturba-
tions? A good solution to this problem can benefit many real-world
applications, e.g., personal privacy protection, fraud escape under-
standing.
Unlike adversarial attacks on node/graph classification where
gradients [37] or limited binary responses [8] of the target classifier
are available, one challenge we face is that there is no feedback from
the target model. For example, in social networking companies like
Facebook or Twitter, community detection algorithms are serving
as a backend for other purposes such as advertising, which prevents
the direct interactions between the target model and individuals. To
tackle this challenge, we design a surrogate community detection
model which is based on the widely used graph neural networks
(GNNs) [15] and a popular community detection measure normal-
ized cut [30]. We attack this surrogate community detection model
and verify that the attack can also be transferred to other popular
graph learning based community detection models.
In the literature of adversarial attack on graph data, one com-
monly observed difficulty is that it is very hard to quantify the
adversarial costs of various attacks [31]. While imperceptible per-
turbations can be checked by human in the image domain, it is
impossible to adopt the same strategy in the graph domain. Cur-
rently, most existing methods tackle this indirectly with either a
discrete budget to limit the number of allowed changes [8, 31] or a
predefined distribution such as power-law distribution [37]. How-
ever, the former based on discrete changes is helpful but far from
sufficient, whereas the latter emphasizing a power-law distribu-
tion is proven to be rare in reality [3]. In this work, we propose a
clearly comprehensible graph objective to measure the degree of
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Figure 1: An example of adversarial attack on community detection by hiding individuals. At first, the two targets are clustered
into one community (Fig. 1(a)). With a small perturbation of deleting an edge (Fig. 1(b)), the two targets are assigned into
different communities by the same detection method (Fig. 1(c)).
perturbations from two perspectives: local proximity and global
proximity.
Another challenge we face is the huge computation space of se-
lecting proper candidate edges/nodes to modify. It is non-trivial to
develop a solution that can scale with the size of graphs. Existing so-
lutions such as [34] rely on heuristics to bypass this problem, which,
however, fail to derive optimal choices, especially for attributed
graphs. In this work, we design a novel graph generation model
which learns to select the proper candidates. With this approach,
we can not only generate proper adversarial graphs to attack com-
munity detection models, but also explicitly take the imperceptible
perturbation requirement into the learning process.
Our contributions are summarized as follows.
• We study adversarial attack on graph learning based com-
munity detection models via hiding a set of nodes, which,
to the best of our knowledge, has not been studied before.
Our proposed solution CD-ATTACK achieves superior attack
performance to all competitors.
• We propose a new graph learning based community detec-
tion model which relies on the widely used GNNs and the
popular measure normalized cut. It serves as the surrogate
model to attack; furthermore, it can also be used for solving
general unsupervised non-overlapping community detection
problems.
• We define a comprehensible graph-related objective to mea-
sure the adversarial costs for various attacks from two per-
spectives: local proximity and global proximity.
• We design a novel graph generation neural network that can
not only produce adversarial graphs to community detection
algorithms, but also satisfy the discrete constraint.
• We evaluate CD-ATTACK on four real-world data sets. Our
method outperforms competing methods by a large margin
in two measures. In addition, we validate that the adversarial
graphs generated by our method can be transferred to two
other popular graph learning based community detection
models.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2
gives the problem definition and Section 3 describes the design of
CD-ATTACK. We report the experimental results in Section 4 and
discuss related work in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes the
paper.
2 PROBLEM DEFINITION
We denote a set of nodes as V = {v1,v2, . . . ,vN } which represent
real-world entities, e.g., authors in a coauthor network, users in a
user-user transaction network. We use an N × N adjacency matrix
A to describe the connections between nodes in V . Ai j ∈ {0, 1}
represents whether there is an undirected edge between nodes vi
and vj or not, e.g., a coauthored paper that links two authors, a
transaction that connects two users. In this study, we focus on an
undirected graph; yet our methodology is also applicable to directed
graphs. We use X = {x1,x2, . . . ,xN } to denote the attribute values
of nodes in V , where xi ∈ Rd is a d-dimensional vector.
The community detection problem aims to partition a graphG =
(V ,A,X ) into K disjoint subgraphs Gi = (Vi ,Ai ,Xi ), i = 1, . . . ,K ,
where V = ∪Ki=1Vi and Vi ∩Vj = ∅ for i , j . In our study, we adopt
this formulation which produces non-overlapping communities.
In the context of community detection, we are interested in a set
of individuals C+ ⊆ V who actively want to escape detection as a
community or part of a community, e.g., users who are involved
in some underground transactions and thus eager to hide their
identity, or malicious users who intend to fool a risk management
system. Given a community detection algorithm f , the community
detection adversarial attack problem is defined as learning an at-
tacker function д to perform small perturbations on G = (V ,A,X ),
leading to Gˆ = (Vˆ , Aˆ, Xˆ ), such that
maxL(f (Gˆ),C+) − L(f (G),C+)
s.t. Gˆ ← arg minд(f , (G,C+))
Q(G, Gˆ) < ϵ,
(1)
where L(·, ·) measures the quality of community detection results
with respect to the target C+, Q(G, Gˆ) < ϵ is used to ensure imper-
ceptible perturbations. In this work, we focus on edge perturbations
such as edge insertion and deletion, i.e., Gˆ = (Vˆ , Aˆ, Xˆ ) = (V , Aˆ,X ).
Intuitively, we want to maximize the decrease of the community
detection performance related to a subset C+ by injecting small
perturbations.
Figure 1 depicts an example of community detection adversarial
attack in a user-user transaction network. At the beginning, the
two target individuals are clustered into a community in yellow,
which corresponds to a money laundering group. One target, as a
member of the community, would be suspected of money launder-
ing given the other is exposed somehow. With a small perturbation
by deleting an edge, the target individuals are assigned into two
communities, where the community in purple is a high-credit user
group. Thus the two targets decrease the probability of being de-
tected as a whole.
3 METHODOLOGY
3.1 Framework
In our problem setting, we have two main modules: (1) an adver-
sarial attacker д(·) that aims to perform unnoticeable perturbations
to the original graph such that a set of individuals could be hidden,
and (2) a community detection algorithm f (·) that can partition
a graph into several subgraphs in an unsupervised way. These
two modules are highly interrelated, i.e., the adversarial attacker
д(·) needs the feedback from f (·) to check if the goal of hiding
is achieved or not, and the community detection algorithm f (·)
relies on adversarial examples to enhance its robustness. In the
literature, most studies achieve this interaction by exploiting the
gradient or other moments of a differentiable loss function [37],
which, however, is intractable in discrete data such as graph. To
bypass this difficulty, motivated by [17], we utilize policy gradient
in the Actor-Critic framework as the signal between the interaction
of the two modules. Another point is that, as we focus on black-box
attack meaning there is no specific community detection algorithm
in hand, we need to instantiate ourselves with a surrogate model
with the capacity of generalization and robustness.
In our solution, we design an iterative framework which con-
sists of two neural networks, one working as the adversarial graph
generator д(·) and the other working as the surrogate community
detection method f (·). Figure 2 depicts the framework. The upper
part generates the adversarial graph, which is optimized with re-
spect to the optimum of the surrogate detection model in the lower
part. However, when instantiating the two neural networks, we
face three challenges as follows.
Surrogate community detection model. How to design a surro-
gate community detection algorithm, such that the derived adver-
sarial graph also applies to other community detection algorithms?
Imperceptible perturbations. What criterion shall we use to en-
sure the modification is so small that it cannot be perceived by the
detection module?
Constrained graph generation. How to generate adversarial
graphs which meet the imperceptible requirement efficiently?
These three issues make our problem very complicated. In the
following, we present our solutions to the three challenges and
then recap our framework at the end of this section.
3.2 Surrogate Community Detection Model
We propose a novel graph learning based community detection
model. There are two key issues in a community detectionmodel: (1)
a distance function to measure the result quality, which corresponds
to a loss function in neural networks, and (2) a method to detect
community detection
modelA,	X Â,	X
A,	X
Z
C
encoder
constrained
generator
Figure 2: Overview of our framework. The adversarial graph
generator (in red) produces a constrained adversarial graph,
which is used to train a robust surrogate community detec-
tion model (in yellow).
communities, which corresponds to the neural network architecture.
We discuss these two issues accordingly below.
3.2.1 The loss function. We generalize normalized cut [30],
a widely used community detection measure, to serve as the loss
function of neural networks. Normalized cut measures the volume
of edges being removed due to graph partitioning:
1
K
∑
k
cut(Vk ,Vk )
vol(Vk )
, (2)
where vol(Vk ) =
∑
i ∈Vk deдree(i), Vk = V \ Vk , cut(Vk ,Vk ) =∑
i ∈Vk , j ∈Vk Ai j . The numerator counts the number of edges be-
tween a community Vk and the rest of the graph, while the de-
nominator counts the number of incident edges to nodes in Vk .
Let C ∈ RN×K be a community assignment matrix where Cik = 1
represents node i belongs to community k , and 0 otherwise. As
we focus on detecting non-overlapping communities, an explicit
constraint is thatC⊤C is a diagonal matrix. WithC , normalized cut
can be re-written as:
1
K
∑
k
C⊤:,kA(1 −C:,k )
C⊤:,kDC:,k
, (3)
where D is the degree matrix with Dii =
∑
j Ai j , C:,k is the k-th
column vector of C . Subtracting Eq. 3 by 1, we get the following
simplified target function:
− 1
K
∑
k
C⊤:,kAC:,k
C⊤:,kDC:,k
= − 1
K
Tr((C⊤AC) ⊘ (C⊤DC)),
(4)
where ⊘ is element-wise division, Tr(·) is defined as the sum of
elements on the main diagonal of a given square matrix. Please
refer to Appendix A for detailed derivation for Eqs. 2-4.
Note that C⊤C needs to be a diagonal matrix, we hereby intro-
duce a new penalization term which explicitly incorporates the
constraint on C into the target function. We subtract C⊤C by IK as
a penalization, where IK is an identity matrix. Thus we define the
differentiable unsupervised loss function Lu as follows:
Lu = − 1
K
Tr((C⊤AC) ⊘ (C⊤DC)) + γ  K
N
C⊤C − IK
2
F , (5)
GNN
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Figure 3: Schematic diagram of the surrogate community detectionmodel. It first uses GNNs to derive node embeddings. Based
on the node embeddings, it then assigns similar nodes to the same community.
where
 · F represents the Frobenius norm of a matrix, KN is ap-
plied as normalized cut encourages balanced clustering and voids
shrinking bias [30, 32]. To analyze why the proposed penaliza-
tion is valid, we suppose there are two communities i, j to be clus-
tered with two assignment vectors C:,i ,C:, j respectively. Suppose
each row of C is a distribution and for a non-diagonal element
(C⊤C)i j = ∑x Cx,iCx, j , it has a maximum value when nodes are
assigned uniformly and a minimum value when nodes are assigned
discriminatively. By minimizing this penalization term, we actu-
ally encourage nodes to be assigned discriminatively into different
communities.
3.2.2 The network architecture. This part details the neural
network architecture to derive the community assignment matrix
C , which is trained by minimizing the unsupervised loss Lu in
Eq. 5. In the literature, spectral clustering [30] is usually used to
compute the community assignment matrixC . Due to its limitations
in scalability and generalization, some recent work [29] has used
a deep learning approach to overcome these shortcomings. Our
architecture, which is based on the recent popular graph neural
networks (GNNs) [15, 16] on graph data, has two main parts: (1)
node embedding, and (2) community assignment. In the first part,
we leverage GNNs to get topology aware node representations, so
that similar nodes have similar representations. In the second part,
based on the node representations, we assign similar nodes to the
same community. Figure 3 depicts the overall architecture of our
community detection model. In the following, we introduce each
part in details.
In this work, we use graph convolutional networks (GCNs) [15]
for the purpose of node embedding. In the preprocessing step, the
adjacency matrix A is normalized:
A¯ = D˜−
1
2 (A + IN )D˜−
1
2 , (6)
where IN is the identity matrix and D˜ii =
∑
j (A + IN )i j . Then
we transform node features over the graph structure via two-hop
smoothing:
Hl = A¯σ (A¯XW 0)W 1, (7)
where σ (·) is the activation function such as ReLU (·),W 0 ∈ Rd×h
andW 1 ∈ Rh×v are two weight matrices. Intuitively, this function
can be considered as a Laplacian smoothing operator [20] for node
features over graph structures, which makes nodes more proximal
if they are connected within two hops in the graph. With the node
representations Hl in hand, we are now ready to assign similar
nodes to the same community by:
C = softmax(σ (HlWc1)Wc2), (8)
whereWc1 ∈ Rv×r andWc2 ∈ Rr×K are two weight matrices. The
function ofWc1 is to linearly transform the node representations
from a v-dimensional space to a r -dimensional space, then non-
linearity is introduced by tying with the function σ .Wc2 is used
to assign a score to each of the K communities. Then softmax is
applied to derive a standardized distribution for each node over the
K communities, which means the summation of the K scores for
each node is 1.
To summarize, we design a neural network to serve as the sur-
rogate community detection model, which is trained in an unsu-
pervised way based on the loss function Lu . Another function of
this module is that it can be used to measure the degree of graph
dissimilarities, which is the focus of the next section.
3.3 Imperceptible Perturbations
An adversarial graph should achieve the goal of potential commu-
nity detection attack, while, at the same time, it should be as similar
to the original graph as possible to be stealthy. In the literature,
some work measures the similarity between graphs by the number
of discrete changes, for example, [8, 31] limit the number of allowed
changes on edges by a budget ∆:∑
i<j
|Ai j − Aˆi j | ≤ ∆. (9)
Some other work [37] argues that the graph dissimilarity should
be minimized by maintaining some predefined distribution such as
the power-law distribution. The former based on discrete changes
is helpful but far from sufficient, whereas the latter emphasizing
a power-law distribution is proven to be rare in reality [3]. In this
part, we define a clearly comprehensible graph-related objective to
measure the degree of perturbations.
Encoder Constrained
generator
Node
embedding
Graph
partition
Z
Clean graph
H
Lhide
C
Lperturb
Constrained graph generation Attacked graph Surrogate community detection
Lu
Figure 4: The proposed learning framework. There are two modules: constrained graph generation and surrogate community
detection. With the optimum of the latter, it will generate two losses to guide the learning of the former.
Given G and Gˆ, we know the correspondence between nodes of
the two graphs. The degree of perturbations is measured by the
following perturbation loss:
Lper turb =
∑
vi
KL(ENC(vi |G)| |ENC(vi |Gˆ)), (10)
where KL(·| |·) is the Kullback-Leibler divergence, and KL(P | |Q) =∑
j Pj log
( Pj
Q j
)
. Usually ENC(·) learns node representations by cap-
turing some proximities in an unsupervised fashion. We hereby
introduce two proximities used to encode node representations:
• Local proximity: Given node correspondence, the correspond-
ing nodes in two graphs would be similar if their neighbors
are similar.
• Global proximity: Given node correspondence, the corre-
sponding nodes in two graphs would be similar if their rela-
tions with all other nodes are similar.
The local proximity, or neighborhood/adjacency proximity, is ex-
ploited by many node representation methods [15, 26] within a
graph. As we know the node correspondence, it is also valid to be
used as a graph similarity measurement [18]. By this means, the
representations derived in Eq. 7 are effective to measure the degree
of graph perturbations with respect to the local proximity.
For global proximity, we adopt the widely used Personalized
PageRank [25] defined below.
Definition 3.1. Given a starting node distribution s , a damping
factor α , and the normalized adjacency matrix A¯, the Personalized
PageRank vector πs is defined as:
πs = αs + (1 − α)πs A¯. (11)
With the stationary distribution πs , we actually get the influence
score of the starting node to all the other nodes. By taking each
node as a starting node, we can get A in which Ai j denotes the
influence score of node i to node j. We can utilize the influence
scores by replacing the normalized adjacency matrix A¯ in GCN,
which leads to the PPNP [16] formulation:
Hд = softmax(AXWд). (12)
There is no overhead for this global proximity based graph pertur-
bation measurement as we can use Eq. 12 instead of Eq. 7 in the
surrogate community detection module. By using global proximity,
the graph partition model would be equipped with broader views
compared with local proximity used in GCN, which also benefits
the community detection module.
3.4 Constrained Graph Generation
In this subsection, we describe our method which produces a mod-
ified graph Aˆ that meets the budget constraint in Eq. 9 and the
perturbation constraint in Eq. 10. Inspired by the recent success of
latent variable generative models such as variational autoencoding
[13] in graph generation [12, 14], we use a latent variable model
parameterized by neural networks to generate the graph Aˆ. To be
more specific, we focus on learning a parameterized distribution
over the adjacency matrix A and feature matrix X as follows:
P(Aˆ|A,X ) =
∫
qϕ (Z |A,X )pθ (Aˆ|A,X ,Z )dZ , (13)
where qϕ (Z |A,X ) is the encoding part and ϕ is the encoding param-
eter set, pθ (Aˆ|A,X ,Z ) is the generation part and θ is the generation
parameter set. While the encoding part is straightforward and can
make use of the corresponding encoders in existing work [12, 14],
the generation part is challenging due to the following issues:
• Budget constraint: Generating a valid graph structure with a
budget constraint is hard, as it is a mixed combinatorial and
continuous optimization problem.
• Scalability: Existing graph generation methods suffer from
the large-scale problem [35].
To satisfy the budget constraint, we propose to directly incor-
porate prior knowledge about the graph structure using the mask
[19] mechanism, which can prevent generating certain undesirable
edges during the decoding process. To address the scalability issue,
we use different solutions based on the input graph size: (1) for a
large-scale graph, we design an efficient decoder with O(m) time
complexity by focusing on deleting edges, wherem is the number
of edges, and (2) for a small-scale graph, we are allowed to both
delete and insert edges.
3.4.1 Encoding using GCN. We follow VGAE [14] by using
the mean field approximation to define the variational family:
qϕ (Z |A,X ) =
N∏
i=1
qϕi (zi |A,X ), (14)
where qϕi (zi |A,X ) is the predefined prior distribution, namely,
isotropic Gaussian with diagonal covariance. The parameters for
the variational marginals qϕi (zi |A,X ) are specified by a two-layer
GCN:
µ,σ = GCNϕ (A,X ), (15)
where µ and σ are the vector of means and standard deviations
for the variational marginals {qϕi (zi |A,X )}Ni=1. ϕ = {ϕi }Ni=1 is the
parameter set for encoding.
3.4.2 Constrained generation. For a large-scale graph A, to
strictly meet the budget requirement in Eq. 9, we approximate
pθ (Aˆ|A,X ,Z ) by the following operation:
pθ (Aˆ|A,X ,Z ) =
∏
(i, j)∈S
Θ(Ei j ), (16)
where Ei j = [Zi |Xi ] ⊙ [Z j |X j ], ⊙ represents element-wise multipli-
cation, Zi |Xi is a concatenation of Zi andXi , Θ(·) and S are defined
as below:
bi j =Wb1σ (Wb2Ei j ) i f Ai j = 1, (17)
Θ(Ei j ) = e
bi j∑
ebi j
i f Ai j = 1, (18)
where Θ(Ei j ) is the computed score for keeping the edge by two-
layer perceptrons and softmax function.We sample without replace-
mentm − ∆ edges according to their keeping scores Θ(·) defined
in Eq. 18, and we use set S to denote these edges that have been
chosen. Intuitively, we want to selectm − ∆ edges that exist in the
original graph and maximize their product of keeping scores. With
this strategy, we can also generate graphs that strictly meet the
budget requirement in Eq. 9.
For a small-scale graph, we split the budget ∆ into two parts: ∆/2
for deleting edges and ∆/2 for inserting edges. We approximate
pθ (Aˆ|A,X ,Z ) by:
pθ (Aˆ|A,X ,Z ) =
∏
(i, j)∈S
Θ(Ei j )
∏
(i, j)∈S¯
Ψ(Ei j ), (19)
where S and Θ(·) are derived in the same way as Eqs. 17-18 except
that we just mask out or delete ∆/2 edges. S¯ denotes the set of
edges that have been chosen to be inserted. Ψ(·) is computed in the
same way as Θ(·) with non-identical parameters and the essential
differences are: (1) we compute with the condition of Ai j = 0, and
(2) we add ∆/2 edges to S¯ .
3.4.3 The loss function. Different from the traditional VAE,
our method is not optimized by the unsupervised reconstruction
error, rather it is powered by the following combined loss:
Lд = Lpr ior+(λ1Lhide + λ2Lper turb )(
∑
(i, j)∈S
logΘ(Ei j )
+
∑
(i, j)∈S¯
logΨ(Ei j )),
(20)
where Lpr ior = KL(q(Z |X ,A)| |p(Z )) is the prior loss with p(Z ) =∏N
i=1 P(zi ) =
∏N
i=1 N(zi |0, I ), Lper turb is the imperceptible per-
turbation requirement introduced in Eq. 10, Lhide is used to di-
verge the community assignment distributions within the set of
individuals:
Lhide = min
i ∈C+, j ∈C+
KL(Ci, : | |Cj, :), (21)
where Lhide can be regarded as the margin loss or the smallest
distance for any pair inside C+, λ1 < 0 as we aim to maximize
the margin so that the members of C+ are spread out across the
communities in ∪Ki=1Gi .
To summarize, Eq. 20 receives error signals Lhide and Lper turb
from the surrogate community detection model, which serves as a
reward to guide the optimization of our graph generator.
3.5 The Proposed Model
From the perspective of Actor-Critic framework, the adversarial
attacker д(·) could be considered as the Actor and the community
detection algorithm f (·) could be regarded as the Critic. As the
error signals of adversarial graph generator are obtained from the
community detection model and the community detection model
needs the generated graphs as inputs for robust training, we design
an iterative framework, named Community Detection ATTACKer
(CD-ATTACK), to alternate between minimizing the loss of both
д(·) and f (·). We refer to Figure 4 and Algorithm 1 for details of the
training procedure.
At the beginning of Algorithm 1, we exploit the constrained
graph generator д(G,∆) so as to get an adversarial graph Gˆ (line 4).
We then utilize the idea of robust training and feed both G and Gˆ
into the surrogate community detection model f (·) to compute Lu
(line 6). Based on the optimum of f (·), we get Lper turb and Lhide
to power the learning process of д(·) (line 7-8).
In practice, we have observed the devil in the training process.
We therefore provide a list of practical considerations:
• Pre-training community detection model: An appealing prop-
erty of CD-ATTACK is that pre-training the community
detection model before the iteration results in better perfor-
mance and faster convergence.
• Normalization trick of G: When feeding both G and Gˆ into
f (·), there could be trouble as G and Gˆ have discrete differ-
ences. We thus observe better results if decoupling self-loop
and neighborhood smoothing in GCN, i.e., A¯ = D˜− 12AD˜− 12
and another weight matrix for self-loop.
Algorithm 1: Training the model
Input: G, ∆.
Output: Gˆ.
1 Initial: parametersWд ,Wf ;
2 repeat
3 G ← full batch;
4 Gˆ ← д(G,∆);
5 Lpr ior ← KL(q(Z |X ,A)| |p(Z ));
6 Lu ← f ({G, Gˆ});
7 Lper turb ←
∑
vi KL(ENC(vi |G)| |ENC(vi |Gˆ));
8 Lhide ← mini ∈C+, j ∈C+ KL(Ci, : | |Cj, :);
9 // Update parameters according to gradients
10 Wд ←+ − ▽Wд Lд ;
11 Wf ←+ − ▽Wf Lu ;
12 until deadline;
4 EXPERIMENTS
We validate the effectiveness of our model on four real-world data
sets: (1) DBLP-medium, (2) Finance-medium, (3) DBLP-large, and (4)
Table 1: Statistics of graphs considered
No. of nodes No. of edges No. of features
DBLP-medium 5,304 28,464 305
Finance-medium 5,206 5,494 7
DBLP-large 20,814 119,854 305
Finance-large 20,121 23,732 7
Finance-large. We first evaluate the surrogate model, then check if
the attack can be transferred to other community detection models.
4.1 Data
4.1.1 DBLP. 1 FromDBLP bibliography data, we build two coau-
thor graphs with 5,304 and 20,814 authors respectively. The former
is named DBLP-medium and the latter is named DBLP-large. For
each author, we use a one-hot representation with 305 dimensions
encoding his/her research keywords. Accordingly we construct an
adjacency matrix A by denoting Ai j = 1 and Aji = 1 if the two
authors have coauthored papers.
4.1.2 Finance. From an anonymized user-user transaction data
set provided by Tencent, we select 5,206 and 20,121 users and
build two transaction networks respectively. The former is named
Finance-medium and the latter is named Finance-large. For each
user, we collect 7 features. We construct an adjacency matrix A by
denoting Ai j = 1 and Aji = 1 if the two users have one or more
transaction records.
Table 1 lists the statistics of the four graphs.
4.2 Baselines and Metrics
4.2.1 Baselines. We use the following approaches as our base-
lines:
• DICE [34], which is a heuristic attack strategy. It first deletes
some edges incident to the target set C+, then spends the
remaining budget for inserting edges between C+ and the
rest of the graph.
• Modularity Based Attack (MBA) [9], which weakens the
community structure by deleting intra-community edges and
inserting inter-community edges. It is based on modularity
[24].
• Random Target Attack (RTA), which follows the idea of RND
[37]. Given C+, in each step we randomly sample a node. If
the node is connected to C+, we delete an edge between the
node and C+ randomly; otherwise we add an edge between
the node and C+ randomly.
4.2.2 Metrics. We follow [34] and use two measures to quantify
the degree of hiding:
M1(C+,G) = |Gi : Gi ∩C
+ , ∅| − 1
(K − 1) × maxGi (|Gi ∩C+ |)
, (22)
where K > 1. The numerator grows linearly with the number of
communities thatC+ is distributed over. The denominator penalizes
the cases in which C+ is skewly distributed over the community
structures. Intuitively this measureM1(C+,G) focuses on how well
1https://dblp.uni-trier.de/
the members of C+ spread out acrossG1, . . . ,GK andM1(C+,G) ∈
[0, 1].
M2(C+,G) =
∑
Gi :Gi∩C+,∅
|Gi \C+ |
max(N − |C+ |, 1) , (23)
where the numerator grows linearly with the number of non-
members ofC+ that appear simultaneously with members ofC+ in
the same community. Note the numerator only counts the communi-
ties in which there exists a member ofC+. Basically, this measure fo-
cuses on howwellC+ is hidden in the crowd andM2(C+,G) ∈ [0, 1].
For both measures, a greater value denotes a better hiding per-
formance.
4.2.3 Setup. For all the data sets, we set K = 10, i.e., we cluster
the nodes in each graph into 10 communities. We select the target
nodes by the following process: (1) use Infomap [27] to divide the
graph into 10 communities, and (2) in each community select 5
nodes with the highest degrees and another 5 nodes randomly.
Thus we totally have (5 + 5) × 10 = 100 target nodes for our attack.
The budget ∆ is always 10, if not specified otherwise.
For CD-ATTACK,We use the same network architecture through
all the experiments. Our implementation is based on Tensorflow.
We train the model using minibatch based Adam optimizer with
exponential decay. We set γ = 0.1, the output dimension of the
first-layer GCN to be 32 and that of the second-layer GCN to be 16.
In addition, we set the fully connected layer with 32 rectified linear
units with a dropout rate of 0.3. The initial learning rate is 0.001.
For fair comparison, we separate the training process of CD-
ATTACK and the surrogate community detection model. In other
words, CD-ATTACK receives no feedback from the model to be
attacked. We run all the methods 5 times and report their average
performance.
4.3 Attacks on the Surrogate Model
4.3.1 Attack performance. Table 2 lists the experimental results
on the four data sets. As all the attacks are based on the same graphs
in each data set, we report the values of M1 and M2 rather than
the gain/changes of these measures. Among all approaches, CD-
ATTACK achieves the best performance on all data sets in terms of
both measures, which demonstrates CD-ATTACK’s superiority. In
the following, we compare the performance of the three baseline
methods.
DICE: DICE performs better than RTA on all data sets except DBLP-
medium, worse thanMBA onmost data sets except Finance-medium.
One possible explanation is that DICE follows the heuristic that
decreasing the density of the connections with C+ will help, while
RTA is randomly based and it has a higher probability not to cut
the edges between targets.
MBA: MBA performs quite well compared with the other two base-
lines, which proves the effectiveness of adopting modularity to
select the candidate edges. However it performs worse than DICE
on Finance-medium, meaning it is not stable.
RTA: RTA performs worse than most methods except that it out-
performs DICE on DBLP-medium. A possible explanation is that
randomness may win in some scenarios as it can explore more
possibilities.
Table 2: Performance comparison of different attacks on the surrogate model
Data sets DBLP-medium Finance-medium DBLP-large Finance-large
- M1 M2 M1 M2 M1 M2 M1 M2
DICE 6.35% 41.44% 3.25% 53.55% 6.91% 50.77% 3.66% 72.11%
MBA 7.33% 44.88% 2.80.% 52.00% 7.04% 53.67% 3.08% 72.11%
RTA 6.55% 42.22% 2.53% 42.66% 6.25% 44.66% 1.74% 55.11%
CD-ATTACK 13.72% 52.00% 3.32% 63.00% 8.11% 57.62% 4.14% 87.33%
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Figure 5: CD-ATTACK performance with different budgets
on DBLP-medium
4.3.2 Effect of the budget ∆. We evaluate how the budget ∆
affects the attack performance. Taking CD-ATTACK on DBLP-
medium as an example, we vary ∆ from 2 to 20 and plot the cor-
responding attack performance in terms of M1 and M2 in Figure
5. As we increase ∆, the attack performance improves (i.e., both
M1 and M2 increase), meaning that a larger budget is helpful for
a successful attack. Another observation is that the attack perfor-
mance increases quite fast when ∆ ≤ 10 and becomes stable when
∆ > 10, indicating the effect of ∆ becomes less obvious as we further
increase the budget.
4.3.3 Adversarial cost. We compare the adversarial costs of dif-
ferent attacks on DBLP-medium. The result is shown in Figure 6, in
which local means we use GCN for the neighborhood smoothing
in the surrogate community detection model and global means we
use PPNP [16] instead. From the figure we can find that our method
achieves the lowest perturbation loss, and this is not surprising as
we explicitly take this constraint into consideration when selecting
the proper candidates.
4.3.4 Visualization. To have a better understanding of how CD-
ATTACK works, we target a subgraph of DBLP-medium which
consists of 24 nodes under the attack in Section 4.3.1. We have two
target nodes 8 and 9 included in this subgraph, which correspond
to Sumit Chopra and Geoffrey Hinton respectively. We inspect how
the community assignment changes with respect to the attack,
as depicted in Figure 7. In this figure, different colors represent
different community assignment. As we can see, at the beginning
the community detection algorithm considers the two targets are
in the same community (on the left). As we cut an edge (0, 15) (in
red), the community detection algorithm separates the subgraph
(a) local (b) global
Figure 6: Cost comparison of different attacks on DBLP-
medium
into two parts, thus fails to treat the two targets in one community.
An interesting observation is that the attack CD-ATTACK chooses
is not a direct attack but rather an influence attack, as the removed
edge does not involve either node 8 or 9 as an end point, which
differs from most of our competitors.
4.4 Transferability
In this part, we shall explore whether the adversarial graphs gen-
erated by our methods also apply to other graph learning based
community detection models. In this vein, we select two widely
used target models as follows:
• Node2vec + K-means (NK) which first uses Node2vec [11]
to get node embeddings and then utilizes K-means to derive
community assignments.
• ComE [5] which jointly solves community embedding, com-
munity detection and node embedding in a closed loop. We
use the highest probability across the K communities as the
last community assignment.
We test the transferability of our method with the following proce-
dure: (1) run our method and three competitors and get the corre-
sponding adversarial graphs, and (2) train the target models based
on the adversarial graphs. We report the performance on DBLP-
medium and Finance-medium in Table 3 and Table 4 for NK and
ComE respectively.
As we can see, while all the attacking methods are effective, our
method achieves the best transferability on most measures. We
therefore conclude that our surrogate model and normalized cut
measure are a sufficient approximation of the true measures used
in other models.
5 RELATEDWORK
Attacks on Community Detection. In the literature, three stud-
ies have a similar setting as ours in the sense that they also want
to hide a set of individuals. [22] first formulates the problem and
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Figure 7: A case to show how CD-ATTACK hides individuals
Table 3: Performance comparison of different attacks on NK
Data sets DBLP-medium Finance-medium
- M1 M2 M1 M2
DICE 3.05% 21.11% 12.78% 23.70%
MBA 2.12 % 8.77 % 14.44% 18.15%
RTA 2.54 % 8.33 % 12.78% 18.15%
CD-ATTACK 4.04 % 21.77 % 13.89% 33.34%
Table 4: Performance comparison of different attacks on
ComE
Data sets DBLP-medium Finance-medium
- M1 M2 M1 M2
DICE 3.08% 5.33% 5.56% 45.00%
MBA 1.58 % 5.18 % 10.00% 41.67%
RTA 3.14 % 4.77 % 4.44% 28.33%
CD-ATTACK 5.56% 7.33% 5.56% 65.00%
comes up with a solution by adding edges for nodes with high de-
gree centrality. Later [34] proposes two heuristic algorithms ROAM
and DICE for hiding an individual and a community respectively.
It also formulates two measures to quantify the level of decep-
tion of a detection algorithm, which we follow in this work. [9]
further extends the idea by proposing the concept of community de-
ception and two attacking methods: safeness-based deception and
modularity-based deception. Our work differs from them in three
aspects: (1) we focus on deep graph based community detection
methods, (2) our method can handle attributed graphs while none
of the previous studies can, and (3) we consider not only a budget
but also a graph similarity to ensure unnoticeable perturbations.
NeuralNetwork basedCommunityDetection. There have been
many neural network based community detection methods ever
since the pioneer graph embedding studies [11, 26]. One straightfor-
ward approach is first utilizing node embedding methods such as
Node2vec [11] and then applying K-means to obtain cluster assign-
ment results. However, such a pipeline lacks a unified optimization
objective, which makes the results suboptimal. In this regard, [5]
jointly solves community embedding, community detection and
node embedding in a closed loop. However, the gradient still cannot
be passed between different modules. [7] overcomes this problem
by introducing a line-graph based variation of GNNs in a super-
vised community detection scenario. [23] further generalizes GNNs
to tackle unsupervised community detection problems based on
min-cut. Our design is similar to [23] except that we encourage
cluster assignments to be orthogonal by a novel regularization.
Imperceptible Perturbations. Adversarial perturbations are re-
quired to be imperceptible in order to foul the corresponding de-
tecting module. In the image domain, one can use Lp norm distance
[4] to achieve unnoticeable modifications. In the graph domain, it
is still an open problem to ensure unnoticeable perturbations [31].
In [8], the attacker is restricted to add/remove edges in the original
graph within a budget. In [37], the attacker is further required to
maintain the power-law degree distribution in addition to the bud-
get constraint. However, maintaining the power-law distribution
is neither necessary nor sufficient as a recent study [3] has found
real-world networks with a power-law distribution are very rare.
In this work, we leverage the general graph similarity metrics to
measure the degree of modifications, in the hope of guaranteeing
minimal perturbations on the original graph. Especially, we instan-
tiate our measurements by two similarities: Personalized PageRank
[25] and adjacency matrix based similarity.
Constrained Graph Generation. Although there are many stud-
ies on graph generation [12, 14], constrained graph generation has
been studied less. GVAE [19] first constructs parse trees based on
the input graph and then uses Recurrent Neural Networks (RNNs)
to encode to and decode from these parse trees. It utilizes the binary
mask mechanism to delete invalid vectors. NeVAE [28] and CG-
VAE [21] both leverage GNNs to generate graphs which match the
statistics of the original data. Theymake use of a similarmaskmech-
anism to forbid edges that violate syntactical constraint. Our model
also uses the mask mechanism to prevent generating undesirable
edges.
Relation with Other Frameworks. We design an iterative frame-
work in this work. It has some connections with some popular
frameworks.
• Generative Adversarial Network (GAN) [10], which is an
iterative framework consisting of two modules: the genera-
tor and the discriminator. Usually GAN is formulated as a
minimize/maximize paradigm in which the generator aims
to minimize the distance between true and generated data,
while the discriminator wants to maximize the distance. Our
framework is different as it does not belong to this paradigm.
• Actor-Critic framework [17], which is a class of techniques
in reinforcement learning. It consists of two modules: the
actor (generator) and the critic (discriminator). Usually the
actor must learn based on the estimated error signals, e.g.,
policy gradient, from the critic. Our model belongs to this
framework.
6 CONCLUSION
In this paper, we study adversarial attack on graph learning based
community detection models via hiding a set of nodes. To overcome
the difficulty of no explicit feedback from the detection module in
reality, we design a new graph learning based community detection
model based on the widely used GNNs and normalized cut. Given
the huge search space of selecting proper candidate edges to change,
we take a learning approach and design a graph generator that can
meet the discrete constraint. We systematically analyze how we
can measure the adversarial costs of various attacks and come up
with a clear graph objective from two perspectives: local proxim-
ity and global proximity. Experimental results on four real-world
data sets show that CD-ATTACK outperforms other competitors
by a significant margin in two measures. The adversarial graphs
generated can also be transferred to other graph learning based
community detection models.
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A DERIVATIONS OF EQUATIONS (2), (3) AND
(4)
1. The derivation from Eq. 2 to Eq. 3.
Firstly, we have
cut(Vk , V¯k ) =
∑
k ′,k
CT:,kAC:,k ′
= CT:,kA(
∑
k ′,k
C:,k ′)
= CT:,kA(1 −C:,k )
(24)
where 1 is the vector with ones. Besides, we have
vol(Vk ) = CT:,kDC:,k (25)
Based on Eqs. 24 and 25, Eq. 2 can be re-written into Eq. 3 as
follows:
Ncut =
1
K
∑
k
cut(Vk , V¯k )
vol(Vk )
=
1
K
∑
k
CT:,kA(1 −C:,k )
CT:,kDC:,k
(26)
2. The derivation from Eq. 3 to Eq. 4.
Firstly, let us look at the main part in Eq. 3.
CT:,kA(1 −C:,k )
CT:,kDC:,k
=
CT:,kA1 −CT:,kAC:,k
CT:,kDC:,k
=
(
1 −
CT:,kAC:,k
CT:,kDC:,k
) (27)
So the normalized cut loss can be re-written as
Ncut =
1
K
∑
k
CT:,kA(1 −C:,k )
CT:,kDC:,k
=
1
K
∑
k
(
1 −
CT:,kAC:,k
CT:,kDC:,k
)
= 1 − 1
K
∑
k
CT:,kAC:,k
CT:,kDC:,k
= 1 − 1
K
∑
k
(CTAC)k,k
(CTDC)k,k
= 1 − 1
K
Tr
(
(CTAC) ⊘ (CTDC)
)
(28)
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